F-16 A F16-B
 F-16C F16-D 
F-16 E F-4 Phantom
Mirage 2000 Mirage 5
Mirage 5D Mig 21
Mig 21 Mig 21
Mig 21
F-6
F-7
Il-28
TU-16 Alpha jet
L-59 L-29
Tucano Shabarbar
Al Gomhuria UAV Teledyne Ryan's
Model 324
Apache AH-64 Commando
Commando 2 Chinook Ch-47
Sea King Mil-8
C-130 Hercules Beechcraft ECM
HawkEye E2-C Gulf Stream VIP
Gulf Stream IV
VIP K-8 Trainer
Mig 21
K-8
Chinooks
Nicely Packed for
delivery
SH-2GE SeaSprite
For the Egyptian requirement, the SH-2G(E) is equipped
with L-3 Communications AN/AQS-18A dipping sonar and
digital hover coupler.
Armed Mil-8
Commando
Sea King
Armed Gazelle
Egyptian Cobras
Exercises
Refueling Exercise
with the UASF  
Mirage 2000
Mirage 2000EM
Mirage 5
 
Mirage 5 SDD
Mirage M5E
Mig-12 Modernized
(note western AAM)
Mig-21
Mig 23
 
TU-16 with 2 Kelt
Cruise Missiles
[1].jpg)
Front view of
two Egyptian Air Force Tu-16, Tupolev, aircraft taxing
on the runway during airlift exercise Bright Star. The
Tu-16`s NATO designation is Badger.
Advanced Trainer
Alpha jet Advanced
Trainer / Close Ground Support
L29
C-130 Hercules
C-130 Hercules
Antonove 174
 
Buffalo
Hawkeye AEW 
Beechcraft B1900C
Jordanian Greek and
Egyptian F-16s
SU-20
EAF F-16C
block 40 #9951 and #9969 in clean configuration over the
Egyptian coastline
Egypt AF
#1333, re-serialled as #9502
The
HA300 PROTOTYPE LIGHT WEIGHT JET FIGHTER DEVELOPED AND
BUILT IN
EGYPT SEEN SHORTLY BEFORE THE JUNE 1967WAR
1973 War
Photos & Facts
Battle of Al Mansoura
The
Egyptian air force may not believe it won the air war of
October, 1973, but it does believe that it was able to
stay in the air and slug it out with the best the
Israeli air force had to offer, that it denied the enemy
the freedom of operation over Egyptian forces to which
it had become accustomed, that it carried the attack to
enemy ground forces in crucial periods and that it has
knocked considerable chrome off the Israeli air force's
halo of invincibility.
A
Classic Shot
Egyptian Air
force gun camera pictures shows Mig 21, Whose air speed
boom is visible at lover left, attacking an Israeli Air
force Mirage, which, in turn, is on the tail of another
Mig 21.
later...
  (Click
to enlarge)
Egyptian air
force MiG-21 (note air speed boom lower left) makes a
strafing attack on the Israeli air field at Ras Nasrani at
the extreme southern end of Sinai near Sharm al Sheik in
photos above. Attack was made as part of opening Egyptian
offensive on afternoon of Oct. 6, 1973. Note three Israeli
air force Mirage fighters parked (arrows along taxiway in
the open (above). MiG-21 gun camera sight centers on two
Mirages scrambling down runway for takeoff (circles) while
bombs from other EAF strike planes explode on airfield.
Sukhoi
Su-7 fighter-bombers attack an Israeli armored force
logistics park in the Sinai early in the October, 1973,
War. Note fuel tank trailers parked in revetments and
armored vehicles on the move under attack.
Egyptian air force MiG-21 gun camera film shows attacks on
Israeli air force F-4Phantoms during air battles over Nile
Delta. MiG-21 gun sight is shown in circle of blips with
dot in center. Bomb-carrying Israeli Phantom aircraft were
primary target of MiG-21 interceptors during attacks on
Nile Delta airfields and Port Said
Egyptian Air force Mig-21 reconnaissance cast shadow over
grim scene in Sinai (Click on the above photos for
details)
Egyptian Air force fighter-bomber attacks an Israeli patrol
boat off Port Said
Unusual MiG-21 gun camera sequence shows progress of
dogfight with Israeli air force Mirage. MiG-21 is on the
Mirage’s tail in lower left at start of combat and follows
Mirage in steep climbing turn to score hits with 23-mm.
cannon. Mirage fuel catches fire as Israeli pilot
continues in steep climb. This was one of 22 gun camera -
confirmed air victories by a single Egyptian air force
fighter regiment.
 
Egyptian air
force MiG-21 (note air speed boom lower left) makes a
strafing attack on the Israeli air field at Ras Nasrani
at the extreme southern end of Sinai near Sharm al Sheik
in photos above. Attack was made as part of opening
Egyptian offensive on afternoon of Oct. 6, 1973. Note
three Israeli air force Mirage fighters parked(arrows
along taxiway in the open (above). MiG-21 gun camera
sight centers on two Mirages scrambling down runway for
takeoff (circles) while bombs from other EAF strike
planes explode on airfield.
Egyptian
fighters attacking an Israeli camp
***
Cairo-Egyptian
air force mounted one major offensive battle in the
October, 1973, War and then fought a series of defensive
battles to parry the offensive thrusts of the Israeli air
force.
The major
offensive was launched in the afternoon of Oct. 6, 1973,
against a broad spectrum of Israeli defensive positions in
Sinai and began the Egyptian assault that crossed the Suez
Canal and established a major bridgehead on the
eastern bank, which the Egyptian army still occupies. It
consisted of 220 strike aircraft, including MiG-2ls,
Sukhoi Su-7s, MIG-17s and Hawker Hunters, and l00 Mil Mi-8
assault helicopters.
The aircraft strikes were targeted on a pre-planned
series of Israeli installations in Sinai from which
support could be given to the Bar-Lev line fortifications.
These included airfields at Bit Cifgafa, El Arish, Ras
Nasrani and Bir Tamada, command posts, l75-mm. long-range
artillery positions, Hawk missile batteries, electronic
countermeasures (ECM) centers and armored force parks and
logistics centers. All of these targets had been
constructed in full-scale mock ups in the Libyan desert,
and each attack force trained specifically against its
assigned target for weeks in advance of the Yom Kippur
D-day.
These strikes were launched at 2 p.m. Oct. 6 and were
made without any air opposition from the Israeli air
force. Defensive fire was encountered from Hawk missile
batteries and scattered antiaircraft gun positions, and
Egyptian losses were very light.
An example of how the lessons of the 1967 war were
applied in reverse in 1973, was the Egyptians' development
of a special rocket-propelled bomb for deep-cratering
runways. The Israelis originally used this type of weapon,
known as the "concrete Dibber," to blast Egyptian runways in their initial strikes that immobilized the Egyptian
air force on the grounding 1967. On Yom Kippur, 1973, the
Egyptian air force delivered its own rocket-propelled
"Dibbers" on the runways of all the forward Israeli
airfields in Sinai. It also attacked logistics areas and
scattered delayed-action bombs to inhibit movement of
repair personnel. Egyptian officers note that the Sinai
airfields stayed inoperative for 48 hours after the initial
strikes. They also believe they knocked out the main
Israeli command post for the Sinai front, because command
and control communications suddenly shifted to another
installation at El Arish, and the Israeli sector
commander, Maj. Gen. Abraham Mendler, was killed.
They also
claim the destruction of the main ground-based electronic
counter measures station in Sinai and several Hawk
batteries. As further evidence of the complete surprise
achieved by these air strikes, Egyptian air force
commanders cite a complete lack of Israeli radar and
communications jamming.
At last light an Oct. 6, a force of 100
Mi-8 armed
helicopters loaded with 18-man commando teams was launched
deep into Sinai to attack the Israeli-occupied oil fields
and to disrupt the flow of Israeli reinforcements for the
Canal front. We talked with one Egyptian helicopter pilot
who had been decorated for bravery in this phase of the
operations for making three penetrations of Sinai with his
Mi-8. The first two carried commandos who set fire to oil
wells and the third set up a position to interdict one of
the main roads by which Israeli reserve armor had to
travel to reach the Bar-Lev line.
The helicopter crew, supported by commandos armed with Sagger and RPG-7 anti-tank weapons, attacked an Israeli
armored column strung out in single file along the hard
road with sand on one side and marshland on the other.
making it impossible to maneuver. They knocked out the
lead tanks as they appeared, blocking the road and fin
and forcing the 114 armor to retreat in search of another
route to the front. The Mi-8 was equipped with eight
external bomb racks and rocket launcher rails. The pilot
used the helicopter's maneuverability to make direct
attacks on the tank column in support of the deployed
commandos.
Egyptian air force commanders believe the
helicopter-commando assault team played a major role in
disrupting the rear of the Israeli Bar-Lev line during the
time that major counter attacks should have been organized.
They also diverted a portion of the Israeli reserve forces
to widely scattered areas of Sinai to root them out. The
Egyptian commandos took heavy losses, but some of them
returned and some units fought for as long as a week in
the Sharm el Sheikh area before surrendering.
On the second day of the war, the Israeli air force
mounted a major attack on the Egyptian air force bases in
the Nile delta. The Israeli McDonnell Douglas Phantoms, Skyhawks and Dassault-Breguet Mirages came in from the
North at extremely low level over the Mediterranean Sea.
They attacked in seven waves and penetrated to bomb a
number of Egyptian air fields and surface-to-air missile
(SAM) sites. But the Egyptian air defense forces said they
got good warning from their visual observer corps posted
along the seacoast and were able to put up 50 MiG-21
interceptors to begin the massive air battle over the
coastline. The MiG-21 formations attacked the Phantoms
first to get them to jettison their bombs. The Israelis
made a determined penetration, and the air battle swirled
through the air defense force missile belt to the airfield
target areas.
Egyptian air defense force commanders say that in
these air battles over the Nile Delta they did not destroy
a single Egyptian aircraft with missile fire while
extracting a high toll of Phantoms and Skyhawks. They
admit that in other battles over the Suez Canal missile
belt they did hit friendly aircraft with SAM missiles
despite the use of an identification system to distinguish
friend from foe (IFF). Both air force and air defense
force commanders confirmed that, while it was an
operational goal to use the MiG-21 as the first force to
engage enemy aircraft at maximum range, it also was
tactical doctrine for the interceptors to fight within the
missile belt and continue harrying attacking forces all
the way to their targets. They agreed that losses from
friendly missiles were so relatively small that the
tactics of using both interceptors and missiles in the
same airspace was operationally sound and militarily
effective against the offensive formations.
The Oct. 7
sweep against the Nil Delta airfields was the biggest
Israeli air force effort against these targets. Smaller
attacks were continued on the 8th and 9th amid then broken
off completely. The main Israeli air effort shifted to the
Canal zone where it concentrated on attacking the many
bridges and ferry operations across the Suez. These
attacks brought the Israeli aircraft within range of both
the Canal missile belt and the Egyptian interceptors. The
Egyptian air force also continued its strikes in Sinai
against Israeli armor and supply columns and dumps. All of
the aerial battles in the Canal area started at low level
because the interceptors, both MiG-2ls and Mirages, were
after the fighter-bombers attacking at minimum altitude.
After it gave up major air sweeps against the Nile
Delta airfields, the Israeli air force launched a major
campaign against Port Said.
Egyptian commanders are not sure exactly what the
Israeli goal was in its sustained and dogged stir attacks
on Port Said, Some think the Israeli bombing was a prelude
to an airborne assault by paratroops and capture of the
city to open a sea-borne supply route to support
operations on the northeast bank of the Suez Canal. Some
think it was an attempt to flank the main Canal missile
belt and eventually open a path to attack it from the
rear. In any event all agree that Port Said is a key
strategic as well as symbolic point to Egyptians. Most of
the historic invasions of Egypt right up to the 1956
Angle-French attack have come through Port Said, and the
feeling is that if Port Said falls Egypt is really in
danger.
Whatever the
Israeli motives, the air campaign never reached the point
where the defenses were permanently suppressed and
whatever was planned for phase two never was able to
materialize. The air battles stretched over a period of
five days, and each day the Israeli air force was able to
beat down the defenses to the point where its commanders
thought they were destroyed. SAM batteries were smashed,
and the town itself was pounded into ruins, particularly
the shipyards and other facilities essential to the
operation of the Suez Canal. But each night the Egyptian
air defense forces rebuilt their shattered system and were
in action in the morning against the initial Israeli
attacks. The Egyptians claim the Israeli air force lost 28
aircraft in the battles over Port Said to interceptors,
missiles and guns.
The
final air battles were fought over the Israeli armored
breakthrough onto the west bank of the Canal at Deversoir.
These armored forces also captured a number of SA-3 and
AAK sites in the Canal missile belt that temporarily gave
the Israeli air force a gap through which it could provide
close support for the marauding tanks against Egyptian
counterattacks.
The Egyptian air force was sucked into this maw in a
final struggle to stop the Israeli air force attacks and
to attack the spreading Israeli armored columns racing
south toward Suez, Both sides apparently threw everything
they had left into this struggle, The Egyptians, whittled
down by two weeks of combat losses, even committed their
L-29 Delfin jet trainer force to attacks on the Israeli
armor. The Czech-built L-29s also are used for initial
weapon delivery training at the Egyptian air force
training center at Bilbeis and are equipped to deliver
rockets and bombs. Several Delfins were lost in this
effort, but the air force commanders believe they
performed well in the emergency, There is a similarity
between this desperate use of a trainer force and the way
the Israelis committed their Fouga Magister training
airplanes with their instructors on the second day of the
bitter tank battle in the Mitla Pass in June, 1967.
There was another series of swirling, enlarging
dogfights over the expanding Deversoir pocket in the
closing week of the war. The fights generally started on
the deck as interceptors bounced attacking fighter-bombers
acid were in turn bounced by enemy interceptors who were
also hit by arriving reinforcements. It was in these
fights that the Egyptian air force pilots felt strongly
the presence of a new type of pilot flying U. S.-delivered
Phantoms (AW&ST
June30, P. 12).
Another example of how the Egyptian air force applied
the lessons it learned from the Israelis during the war of
attrition was told by a 32-year-old deputy MiG-21 regiment
commander who has been flying since he was 15.
"During the war of attrition, the Israeli air force
had a favorite ambush tactic, he told AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECHNOLOGY. “They would penetrate with two aircraft
at medium altitude where they would be quickly picked up
by radar, We would scramble four or eight to attack them.
But they had another dozen fighters trailing at extremely
low altitude below radar coverage. As we climbed to the
attack they would zoom up behind and surprise us. My
regiment lost Migs to this ambush tactic three times. But
we learned the lesson and practiced the same tactics. In
the final fights over Deversoir, we ambushed some Mirages
the same way, and my own 'finger four' [formation] shot
down four Mirages with the loss of one Mig."
Pilot
Rescue
Cairo-Egyptian
air defense commanders are puzzled by an episode that
occurred late in the October, 1973, War when an Israeli
Phantom was shot down in Sinai and the pilot ejected and
parachuted safely into no-man's land between the two
armies. The Egyptians routinely sent a jeep and two
soldiers to pick up the pilot and were driving back toward
their lines when an Israeli helicopter appeared. It
disgorged a commando team who captured the Egyptians,
spirited the pilot into an armored personnel carrier and
sped off. "They never made that much of an effort for any
other pilot during the whole war," an Egyptian commander
noted. "it must have been very important to them. Could it
have been one of their American pilots?"
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